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Non Technical Abstract 
 
Immigration control is an issue that figures prominently in public policy 
discussions  and  election  campaigns  throughout  Europe.  Although 
immigration may have positive effects on economic efficiency and growth 
in the receiving economy, it is often the negative aspects −or perceived 
negative aspects − of immigration that attract the most attention.  In this 
paper,  we  use  the  immigration  module  of  the  European  Social  Survey 
(ESS), which we developed in collaboration with the ESS survey team, to 
investigate public opinions about immigration, and the various dimensions 
of economic, public and private life that individuals feel are affected by 
immigration.  We  show  that  that  there  is  substantial  variation  in  the 
strength  of  anti immigrant  opinion  across  European  countries,  and  that 
attitudes toward immigration also vary systematically with characteristics 
such  as  age,  education,  and  urban/rural  location.  We  propose  possible 
interpretations of some of these regularities.  
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Understanding attitudes to immigration: The migration 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Immigration control is an issue that figures prominently in public policy discussions and 
election campaigns throughout Europe. Although immigration may have positive effects 
on economic efficiency and growth in the receiving economy, it is often the negative 
aspects −or perceived negative aspects − of immigration that attract the most attention.  
In this paper, we use the immigration  module of the European  Social  Survey (ESS), 
which we developed in collaboration with the ESS survey team, to investigate public 
opinions about immigration, and the various dimensions of economic, public and private 
life  that  individuals  feel  are  affected  by  immigration.  We  show  that  that  there  is 
substantial variation in the strength of anti-immigrant opinion across European countries, 
and that attitudes toward immigration also vary systematically with characteristics such 
as age, education, and urban/rural location. We propose possible interpretations of some 
of these regularities.  
 
The ESS immigration module was designed to measure aspects of public opinion toward 
immigration  that  are  not  readily  available  in  other  surveys.  For  example  the  module 
contains detailed questions on a range of economic consequences that people sometimes 
attribute to increased immigration. It also includes a series of questions that are usually 
not asked in attitude surveys, such as the respondent’s views on the social effects of 
immigration, and questions about the ethnicity, cultural affiliation, and skill level that 
respondents favour among potential immigrant groups. 
 Understanding attitudes to immigration 
- 3 - 
A particular strength of the ESS data is that it includes responses to the same questions 
from people in a large  number of  European and associated countries.  This facilitates 
inter-country comparisons, and makes it possible to relate differences in attitudes across 
countries to country-specific factors, such as the current level of unemployment or the 
relative  size  of  the  immigrant  population  in  a  country.    On  the  downside,  designing 
questions that are understood in the same way across countries with different languages, 
different  immigration  experiences,  and  different  legal  structures  necessarily  leads  to 
compromises.  Moreover, some of these historical, cultural, and legal factors may exert 
an independent effect on the way questions are interpreted that is difficult to untangle 
from  differences  in  underlying  attitudes  across  countries.    For  example,  in  countries 
where citizenship is automatically conveyed to anyone born in the country, “immigrants” 
may be generally understood to include only people born abroad.  In countries where 
citizenship  is  linked  to  ethnic  origin,  however,  “immigrants”  may  be  generally 
understood to include people of foreign ethnicity, regardless of place of birth.  
 
The issues of immigration and immigration control never fail to elicit strong reactions 
whenever  they  are  raised  by  political  actors  or  brought  to  the  centre  of  attention  by 
current events.  Attitudes toward immigration are clearly linked to deeply held views 
about  the  economic  self-interest  and  social  identity  of  the  native  population.    We 
therefore begin the paper by discussing various theoretical frameworks that have been 
developed to interpret individual reactions to the immigration issue (section 2). We begin 
with  models  of  economic  self-interest,  and  then  discuss  broader  sociological  models 
focused on aspects of identity and group affiliation.  Our exposition is necessarily brief Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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and circumscribed, and we refer interested readers to several existing surveys of these 
topics. 
 
In the third section of the paper we present a brief description of the ESS immigration 
module,  and  discuss  some  of  the  difficulties  and  ensuing  compromises  that  arise  in 
designing questions that are reasonably comparable across countries. Sections 4 and 5 are 
devoted  to  describing  the  data  in  the  ESS  module  in  some  detail.  Our  exposition  is 
descriptive, and relies on simple statistical tools. Again, a deeper analysis is beyond the 
scope  of  this  paper.
**   Nevertheless,  the  results  are  of  substantial  interest  given  the 
importance of the immigration issue throughout Europe.  In particular, we show that there 
is considerable heterogeneity in overall attitudes toward immigration across countries, 
and at the same time wide variation in attitudes within countries along such dimensions 
as age and education.  We show how views toward immigration are related to underlying 
views about the potential effects of immigrants on economic and social outcomes.  We 
also highlight differences across countries and across subgroups in views about what 
types of immigrants are most welcome, and which particular characteristics of potential 
immigrants are most valuable or objectionable. 
 
2.  Sources of differences in opinion about immigration. 
 
 
As  we  pointed  out  above,  the  issue  of  immigration  seems  to  capture  the  public 
imagination forcefully in many countries. But why should people be concerned about 
                                                 
** We have undertaken such an analysis in a separate project (Card, Dustmann, and Preston in preparation). Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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immigration? Some of these concerns may have economic origins.  Fear of job loss or 
wage competition and concerns over the costs of social programmes are often cited as 
reasons to oppose immigration.   Other reasons relate to cultural alienation and fear that 
immigrants will undermine the traditional language, religion, political power, or way of 
life of the native population.  Both economic and social concerns about immigration may 
be based partly on ignorance, and/or the tendency of people to overemphasise anecdotal 
rather than systematic evidence.  In this section, we will briefly describe some of the 
models  that  have  been  developed  by  social  scientists  to  understand  views  about 
immigration.    We  begin  with  economic  theories,  focusing  on  the  simplest  possible 
models of economic self interest.  We then present a very brief review of the sociological 
theories. 
 
2.1.  Immigration and the economy 
 
 
There  is  a  large  literature  in  economics  that  is  concerned  with  the  way  immigration 
affects residents of the host country or those who stay behind in the source economy (see 
for  instance  Berry  and  Soligo  1969;  Kenen,  1971;  Bhagwati  and  Rodriguez  1976; 
Bhaghati  and Brecher 1980;  Altonji and Card  1991; Gaston and  Nelson 2000). The 
effects on the host and sending countries are in certain respects mirror images.  We will 
concentrate our discussion here on the receiving (or host) economy. Our discussion will 
attempt to capture some important arguments of this literature without providing detail, 
as detailed exposition is far beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Immigration has an economic effect primarily because it alters the size and composition 
of the labour force of the receiving country.  It both expands the total supply of labour 
relative to other inputs to production and (if the immigrating labour force has a different 
skill composition than the existing resident labour force) changes the relative supply of 
different skill groups.  The economy needs to respond in some way to employ this new 
labour or unemployment will grow.  Since employers can be induced to hire additional 
workers if wages are reduced, it is natural to consider the possibility that immigration 
depresses the wages of competing labour.  Thus, a simple hypothesis of economic self 
interest suggests that lower-skilled workers will be opposed to inflows of low-skilled 
immigration (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).  On the other hand, high-skilled workers and 
employers tend to gain if relative wages of less-skilled workers are bid down, suggesting 
that these groups will be in favour or less-skilled immigrant inflows. 
  Despite the intuitive appeal of this line of argument, more sophisticated economic 
models suggest that the impact of immigration on wages will be relatively small, or even 
zero.  The standard model used by economists to analyze inter-country trade flows 
suggests that adjustments in industry structure can absorb new supplies of labor with little 
or no change in wages.  Morever, empirical evidence that immigration lowers wages is 
surprisingly difficult to find (see Card, 2005 for a recent review).  Nevertheless, some 
economists believe that immigrant inflows depress competing wages (e.g., Borjas, 2003) 
and in any case it seems plausible that lower-skilled workers could oppose immigration 
based on the belief that it will lower their economic opportunities. 
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The  economic  effects  of immigration  are  not  confined to  labour  market competition. 
Immigrants  pay  taxes,  receive  transfer  payments,  and  make  use  of  public  services. 
Whether their net effect on the government budget is positive or negative depends on the 
demographic and economic characteristics of the immigrants, and on the nature of the tax 
and benefit system in a particular country.  A self-interest argument suggests that native 
residents could be expected to oppose inflows of immigrant groups who pay less in taxes 
than they receive in benefits, and support immigration by groups who will pay more in 
taxes  than  they  will  receive  in  benefits.    The  latter  case  may  be  more  important  in 
countries  with  rapidly  aging  populations,  since  immigrants  tend  to  be  in  their  prime 
working years, and can contribute to a favourable readjustment in the age structure of the 
population.    On  the  other  hand,  natives  may  resent  the  claims  made  on  health  and 
education services by immigrants who are not seen to have contributed adequately to 
their funding. 
 
Another cost of immigration that is particularly prominent in the recent policy debate in 
Europe is the effect of immigrants on crime.  While the evidence in the U.S., for example, 
is that immigrants have much lower rates of criminality than natives (Butcher and Piehl, 
1998),  some  immigrants  commit  crimes.    The  presence  of  immigrants  may  also 
contribute  indirectly  to  crime,  if  immigration  leads  to  increased  group  conflict,  or  if 
social tensions lead to harassment or violence towards immigrants.  It is an open question 
whether concerns over the effect of immigration on crime reflect rational calculations 
based on the incidence of criminal behaviour among immigrants and the costs of crime, Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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or if these concerns are really driven by other channels, such as those emphasized by the 
sociological theories we discuss next. 
 
So far we have concentrated our discussion on the economic effects of immigration on 
the receiving country.  The departure of migrants from sending countries also changes the 
size and composition of their labour forces, potentially raising wages but also depriving 
them of workers with particular skills.  Emigration may also affect the public finances of 
the source countries and alter their demographic structure and cultural character.  An 
important consideration for many immigrant source countries is the flow of remittances 
from emigrants to family members who remain behind.  Indeed, international remittances 
are  a  leading  source  of  income  for  many  source  countries.    The  potentially  positive 
impact of remittances underscores an important insight from economic analysis, which is 
that flows of migrants can potentially benefit both the host and the source countries.  To 
the  extent  that  immigrants  move  where  their  wages  are  higher,  there  is  an  overall 
efficiency  gain for  the  world  economy.   Altruistic  residents of  the  host  country  may 
therefore support immigration as a way to improve the lives of residents of poor countries. 
 
Different European countries have very different histories of relations with other parts of 
the world, including periods of colonial control that may have left enduring links in some 
nations.  One may expect the strength of altruistic feeling towards the source countries to 
differ widely between potential host countries and to contribute to differences in opinions 
toward immigration as a whole.   
 Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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2.2.  Social costs of Immigration 
 
The  perceived  threat  to  the  economic  self-interest  of  the  native  population  posed  by 
immigrant inflows may be only part of a wider sense of collective threat to social and 
cultural  institutions  (Blalock  1967;  Blumer  1958;  Bobo  1983).    In  many  cases, 
immigrants are from different racial and ethnic groups than the native population, and 
have different religious, political, and cultural backgrounds.   Inflows of groups with a 
different  religion,  language,  or  culture  may  be  perceived  as  undermining  existing 
institutions and threatening the way of life and social status of current residents.  The 
unfamiliarity  of  immigrants  may  also  attract  hostility  rooted  in  the  displacement  of 
aggressive  impulses  attributable  to  stress  in  the  social  environment  (Le  Vine  and 
Campbell 1972). 
 
Sociologists have developed a variety of theoretical models that elucidate some of the 
channels through which immigrants (or members of other ethnic or cultural groups) may 
threaten natives (or members of a majority group).  Perhaps the leading set of theories 
used to model immigrant attitudes are based on realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 
1965).  This theory posits that the perception of a zero sum competition between groups 
translates into a belief in a “group threat” which in turn leads to prejudice and negative 
stereotyping by members of one group against the other, while simultaneously bolstering 
within-group cohesion (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999)..  Realistic conflict theory broadens 
the notion of self interest among natives to incorporate the possibility that harm to one 
subgroup of natives could be perceived as harmful to all natives.  It also widens the Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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dimensions of perceived inter-group competition to include political power and control 
over accepted social and cultural practices.   
 
Another theoretical model that is sometimes used to discuss attitudes toward immigrants 
is social identity theory.  This theory posits that people strive to achieve positive social 
identity, which is reinforced by favourable comparisons between one’s own group and an 
outside group (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986).  Differentiation from the outside 
group through discrimination or prejudicial attitudes can therefore increase social identity.  
Social identity theory offers a useful insight into the evolution of native perceptions of 
immigrant criminality.  In particular, even if immigrants are less likely to commit crime 
than natives, the belief that immigrants are a leading cause of crime may be identity-
reinforcing for members of the native population, since this belief shifts the responsibility 
for crime to the outside group, and at the same time accentuates the gap between the 
native population and immigrant groups. 
 
While pursuit of social identity could be a source of negative attitudes toward immigrants, 
it could also lead to more positive  attitudes if  the native group’s identity is strongly 
linked to notions of fairness, equality, or social justice.  To the extent that some countries 
have a strong tradition of emphasizing fairness and social justice, whereas others do not, 
this channel could be helpful in explaining cross-country differences in opinions toward 
immigration.  The difficulty of deriving unambiguous predictions about attitudes toward 
minority groups from social identity theory is noted by Likata and Klein (2002), who 
discuss the alternative possibilities in the specific context of European attitudes toward Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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immigrants.    They  argue  that  that  on  balance  the  emergence  of  a  “European”  social 
identity in the post-war period has led to more negative views of immigrants.   
 
Both  the  economic  and  sociological  theories  suggest  that  the  perceived  effects  of 
immigration  will  vary  according  to the  origin and personal  characteristics  of  specific 
immigrant groups, and also according to the characteristics of the person whose opinion 
is being considered.   We should therefore expect attitudes towards immigration to differ 
systematically depending upon what sort of immigration is involved and whom we are 
asking to give their opinion.  
 
3.  The ESS Immigration Module 
 
The structure of the biannual ESS allows for two specialized modules on particular issues. 
Interested researchers are invited to propose modules, and to develop the questions in the 
module  together  with  the ESS  survey team. The  first ESS  contained  two  specialized 
modules, one on migration and minorities, and one on citizenship. The authors of this 
paper proposed the migration and minority module, and developed the questionnaire with 
the assistance of the ESS team. 
 
Although  one  of  the  primary  goals  of  the  ESS  is  to  provide  data  for  quantifying 
differences across the populations of different European countries, it is very difficult to 
develop questions about attitudes toward immigrants that will be interpreted in the same 
way in different countries.  European countries have very different histories with respect Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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to  immigration,  and  also  different  laws  governing  immigration  and  citizenship.    The 
design of the questions in the ESS has to take account of these contextual differences to 
minimize inter-country variation in the way respondents interpret the questions.  As a 
result of these concerns, the ESS module on immigration is as finely tuned as it could be 
if the questions were only asked in a single country.  Before turning to an analysis of the 
responses to the questionnaire, we briefly illustrate some of the difficulties that arise in 
designing a questionnaire on a topic like migration, and the compromises that emerged 
out of this process. 
 
The  module  begins  with  a  preamble  intended  to  establish  terms  of  reference  for  the 
respondent and to provide an initial definition of “immigrants”.   Ironically, the word 
“immigrant”  has  different  connotations  in  different  countries,  and  it  was  therefore 
decided to avoid the use of the word, and to refer instead to “people who come to live in 
[the country] from abroad.” The phrase “to live” was favoured over alternatives such as 
“to settle” or “to stay” to leave open the issue of whether immigrants are permanent or 
temporary.   A brief list of reasons for “coming to live” was offered to focus respondents 
on the types of immigrant inflows we wished them to consider as they answered the 
questions. 
 
A central issue in the ESS immigration module is the respondent’s overall preference for 
the  restrictiveness  of  immigration  policy.    Typically,  surveys  have  asked  how  a 
respondent would alter policy from its current stance (i.e., whether they would prefer to 
relax or tighten immigration policy).  This wording was felt to be inappropriate given the Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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wide variation in current policy stances across the ESS countries.  We therefore settled on 
a more neutral wording asking how many people of different types should ideally be 
permitted to enter the country on a 4-point scale:  “many”, “some”, “few”, or “none”.  
 
We also wanted to elicit respondents’ views about the relative desirability of different 
types of potential immigrants.   Here, national surveys can name specific origin countries 
or regions of the world, concentrating on prominent source countries for the country at 
hand.  In a cross national survey such as the ESS this is impossible, since different source 
countries are salient in different countries, depending on historical links, geography, and 
other  factors.    We  therefore  settled  on  a  wording  which  distinguished  first  between 
people  “coming  to  live”  who  were  of  the  same  or  different  ethnicity  to  that  of  the 
majority community, and second between people “coming to live” from richer and poorer 
countries inside and outside Europe. 
 
These examples explain the choice of wording adopted in the ESS immigration module, 
and  illustrate  some  of  the  compromises  that  were  adopted  to  ensure  cross-national 
comparability of responses.  Despite these compromises, we believe that the resulting 
survey provides a rich source of data and information on issue that are at the core of one 
of the most important social and economic debates in Europe. In the following sections, 
we will illustrate and analyse some of the key information in the survey. 
 
 Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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4.  Opinion about immigration and types of immigrants 
 
4.1.  Which types of immigrants are welcome? 
 
We begin by describing responses to questions on overall attitudes to further immigration. 
As explained, respondents were asked separately about opinions regarding people of the 
same or different race/ethnicity,  people from richer or poorer countries within Europe, 
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Source: ESS 2003
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Source: ESS 2003
Different Race/Ethnicity than Majority
Allow Immigration
 
Figure 4.1.1: Attitudes to immigration and ethnicity of the immigrant 
 
 
Figure 4.1.1 displays the distribution of responses to the questions on attitudes toward 
allowing more or less immigrants of the same or different ethnicity than the majority 
population in the respondent’s country.  The first interesting thing to note is that the 
fraction of respondents who want to completely stop all further immigration is small -  
between 6 and 11 percent.  On the other hand, the fraction who want to allow many new 
people  to  come  to  live  is  also  small.  Most  responses  are  in  the  intermediate  range, Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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supporting  policies  that  allow  for  some,  or  few  immigrants.    A  second  notable 
observation is that there is more overall support for immigration of ethnically similar 
people than for ethnically different people. Almost a quarter of respondents expressed a 
preference for a lower level of immigration of ethnically different immigrants than of 
ethnically similar immigrants (about 10 times more than the number making a distinction 
the other way).  Nonetheless the differences are not dramatic: over three quarters of ESS 





allow many to come and live here allow some
allow a few allow none
Source: ESS 2003






allow many to come and live here allow some
allow a few allow none
Source: ESS 2003
Poor countries outside Europe
Allow Immigration
 
Figure 4.1.2: Attitude to immigration and prosperity of the origin country   
 
Figure  4.1.2  shows  the  responses  to  questions  about  the  desirability  of  more  or  less 
immigrants from richer and poorer countries.  The question was asked separately for 
people coming from inside Europe from outside Europe, but in the interest of space we 
show only the responses for people from outside Europe.  Not surprisingly, immigration 
from richer countries is more welcome than immigration from poorer countries.  Indeed, 
attitudes  to  immigration  from  poorer  countries  outside  Europe  are  very  similar  to 
attitudes toward immigrants who have different race/ethnicity than the receiving country.  
To illustrate this point, tables 4.1.1-3 report cross-tabulations of responses from the two 
sets of questions. As a starting point, Table 4.1.1 shows the probabilities of different Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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responses to the questions concerning immigrants of a different ethnicity, conditional on 
the responses to the question on immigrants of the same ethnicity.  As we noted earlier, 
people  tend  to  be  more  negative  about  immigrants  of  a  different  ethnicity.    This  is 
revealed by the larger fractions above the main diagonal of the table.  For instance, only 
59  percent  of  those  who  favour  many  immigrants of  the  same  race  or  ethnicity also 
favour many immigrants of a different race or ethnicity, while 25 percent favour some, 
and 16 percent only a few or none. 
 
Table 4.1.1: Attitudes to immigration by ethnicity of the immigrant  
 
Allow many/few 
immigrants of same 
race/ethnic group 
as majority 
Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from 
majority 
  Allow many  Allow some  Allow a few  Allow none  Total 
Allow many to come  59  25  13  3  5952 
Allow some  0.8  73  23  3  17781 
Allow a few  0  5  83  11  11587 
Allow none  0  2  5  93  2368 
Total  3680  15120  14648  4240  37688 
 
Tables 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 display the same probabilities for immigration from poorer/richer 
countries within Europe, and poorer/richer countries outside Europe. A similar pattern is 
observable,  with  a  generally  less  liberal  view  on  immigration  from  less  prosperous 
countries. Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside 
Europe 
  Allow many  Allow some  Allow a few  Allow none  Total 
Allow many to 
come  83  14  3  0  4300 
Allow some  1  85  13  1  16201 
Allow a few  0  5  89  6  13846 
Allow none  0  2  7  91  3411 
Total  3802  15159  14716  4081  37758 
 






Allow many/few immigrants from richer countries outside 
Europe 
  Allow many  Allow some  Allow a few  Allow none  Total 
Allow many to 
come  75  19  6  1  5325 
Allow some  2  82  15  1  16236 
Allow a few  0  8  86  6  12192 
Allow none  0  3  10  86  3704 
Total  4298  15425  13557  4177  37457 
 
For convenience in what follows we condense the information in the responses to these 
six  questions  into  a  single  index  of  the  pro-immigrant/anti-immigrant  stance  of  the 
respondent.    Specifically,  we  classify  a  respondent  as  favouring  a  tight  immigration 
policy if they would prefer to allow few or no immigrants when asked about immigration 
of either the same or different ethnicity.  Equivalently, we classify someone as favouring 
a liberal policy if they indicate that they would prefer some or many immigrants of both 
the same and different ethnicities.  Alternative methods of combining the information 
from the various questions lead to very similar classifications. 
 Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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4.2.  What characteristics should immigrants have? 
 
Questions were asked in the survey not only about preferences over the relative numbers 
of different immigrants from different sources, but also about the importance attached to 
a variety of criteria in determining eligibility for immigrant status.  Answers to these 
questions  provide  additional  insights  into  the  preferences  of  respondents  regarding 
immigration  flows.  In Table  4.2.1  we present the  mean  preferences  for  each  type  of 
qualification,  assigning  a  1  if  the  respondent  said  the  particular  qualification  was 
extremely important, a 0 if he/she said it was qualification was extremely unimportant, 
and intermediate values for the intermediate responses.  We show the mean preferences 
for individuals who favour a liberal policy (column1), a tight immigration policy (column 
2) and for all individuals (column 3), based on the dichotomous classification introduced 
in the previous section. 
 
Table 4.2.1: Which qualifications for immigration are considered important, by overall preference for 
immigration.  (Means) 
  
Preference for Immigration   
Qualification for 
immigration   
(0: Extremely 
unimportant  1: 
Extremely important)  Liberal  Tight  Total 
unweighted 
base 
Education  0.56  0.68  0.62  38920 
Skills  0.59  0.74  0.67  38996 
Wealth  0.22  0.39  0.32  37710 
Family  0.50  0.57  0.54  38838 
Language  0.61  0.75  0.68  39254 
Way of life  0.69  0.81  0.75  39152 
Christian  0.26  0.43  0.35  38880 
White  0.14  0.31  0.24  39027 
unweighted base  18104  21756  39860   
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In general, education, work skills, linguistic ability and, most importantly, commitment to 
a country’s way of life are seen as important, whereas wealth, religion and race are less 
so.  Family connections to the host country fall somewhere between these two extremes.  
The relative importance attached to different qualifications is generally similar for those 
with  more  or  less  liberal  views  on  immigration  numbers.  An  interesting  exception, 
however,  is  the  relative  importance  attached  to  being  a  Christian,  or  being  of  white 
ethnicity.  Respondents who favour a tighter immigration policy tend to put more weight 
on these two attributes relative to those who favour a more liberal policy.  
 
4.3.  How much difference is there across countries? 
 
Our  analysis  so  far  has  focused  on  the  overall  ESS  survey  population,  without 
distinguishing between different countries in the sample.  Map 1 shows the extent of 
cross-country differences  in  attitudes  toward  immigration,  using  the  mean  fraction  of 
respondents in the country who are classified as wanting “tight” immigration as a ranking.  
The proportion of respondents favouring tight immigration policy ranges from a low of 
17.9%  in  Sweden  to  a  high  of  86.1%  in  Greece  and  87.0%  in  Hungary.    This  is  a 
remarkably wide range of variation, and presumably reflects many factors, including the 
current state of the economy, past and present migration policy, and past and present 
exposure to immigration and differences in the type of resident immigrants. A detailed 
analysis is far beyond the scope of this paper, but is provided in Card, Dustmann and 
Preston  (in  preparation).  In  the  next  section  we  illustrate  the  relationship  with  some 
country characteristics. Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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Figure 4.3.1: Mean attitudes towards immigration in the ESS countries  
 
 
4.4. Factors associated with country differences? 
 
Two  obvious  explanations  for  differences  in  attitudes  toward  immigration  policy  are 
differences in economic conditions, and differences in the number of immigrants already 
present in the country.  In section 2 we discussed economic and sociological theories 
relevant to overall attitudes towards further immigration.  Better economic conditions 
may lead to reduced concerns about the degree of labour market competition posed by 
immigrants, and may also help alleviate stresses that are displaced into an anti-immigrant 
sentiment (Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Green, Glaser and Rich 1998).  The size of Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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the immigrant population may affect the perceived threat posed by further immigration to 
the social prerogatives of the majority community.   It may also influence the degree of 
contact between the native and immigrant communities.  Different theories predict that 
greater day-to-day contact with immigrants may either increase or decrease the perceived 
threat posed by immigrants.   
 
We  concentrate  here  on  three  indicators  that  capture  the  overall  prosperity  of  the 
receiving country, labour market conditions, and previous immigration history.  These 
are: GDP per capita
††, the unemployment rate
‡‡, and the relative fraction of the foreign 
born in the domestic population
§§.  Figures 4.4.1-3 are  cross-country scatter-plots that 
illustrate the association between each of the three indicators and the overall attitude 
towards immigration in the country (as measured by the fraction of respondents classified 
as favouring tighter immigration policy).  We also superimpose on each figure the best-
fitting  regression  line  linking  the  indicator  (graphed  on  the  horizontal  axis)  to  anti-
immigrant sentiment (graphed on the vertical axis).
 ***,
†††.   
 
Looking first at the impact of a larger foreign-born population (figure 4.4.1), there is a 
negative relation between higher immigrant stocks and the fraction of people who want to 
restrict immigration, but the relationship is not statistically significant.  (The regression 
coefficient and its standard error are given in the footnote of the figure).   Likewise, the 
                                                 
†† GDP per capita , PPP(current international $,in thousands). Source: World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
‡‡ Source: OECD Economic Outlook 74, available at www.oecd.org . They refer to year 2002 
§§ Source: OECD Database on Immigrants and Expatriates 
*** We do not weight  for population size. 
††† We intend these descriptively – the limited cross country variation provides insufficient degrees of 
freedom to attempt a serious multivariate analysis of the country level processes involved. Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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data in figure 4.4.2 suggest a relatively weak association between attitudes and economic 
prosperity.   Finally,  the  relationship  between unemployment  and  views  on  restricting 
immigration  (figure  4.4.3)  is  also  quite  weak.    These  results  seem  to  contradict  the 
common  belief  that  adverse  economic  conditions  are  an  important  driver  of  hostility 
towards immigration
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Figure 4.4.1: Attitude to immigration and foreign born population , by country  
Note: Regression  (Standard error in parenthesis):  Population Born  Foreign  * 007 . 0 48 . 2 Attitude
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‡‡‡ A similarly weak relationship is found between anti-immigrant attitudes and local unemployment in a 
recent study of spatial patterns in attitudes in Britain by two of the present authors (Dustmann and Preston 
2004). Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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Figure 4.4.2: Attitude to immigration and GDP per capita, by country 
Note: Regression  (Standard error in parenthesis):  capita per    GDP * 006 . 0 57 . 2 Attitude
) 053 . 0 ( ) 143 . 0 (
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Figure  4.4.3: Attitude to immigration and unemployment rate  
Note: Regression  (Standard error in parenthesis):  rate nt  Unemployme * 01 . 0 34 . 2 Attitude
) 013 . 0 ( ) 07 . 0 (
− = ,  030 . 0
2 = R  
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4.5.  How do attitudes vary across individuals? 
 
The  previous  section  has  demonstrated  that  there  is  wide  variation  across  the  ESS 
countries  in  attitudes  towards  immigration  that  is  only  weakly  related  to  factors  like 
unemployment, income, and the presence of immigrants.  As would be predicted by both 
economic and sociological theories, however, there is also wide variation in attitudes 
toward immigration within each country.  Given the wealth of information on individual 
characteristics in the ESS this provides an informative basis for assessing the sources of 
attitudinal differences.  For example, theories based on economic self interest suggest that 
people  who  compete  in  the  same  labour  market  as  immigrants  will  be  opposed  to 
immigration,  while  those  who  mainly  consume  goods  or  services  produced  by 
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Figure 4.5.1: Attitude to immigration by age and education  
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Two key variables that distinguish individuals are their educational attainment, and their 
age. To explore the differences across age-and education groups we group individuals by 
age and education, where we distinguish between low, intermediate and high education, 
and age groups between 20 and 30, 31-45, 46-60, and above 60. We exclude individuals 
who are still in full time education. 
 
Figure 4.5.1 shows the differences in the average value of our index of anti-immigrant 
sentiment by age and education.   Each line refers to a specific age group, while the 
horizontal axis distinguishes between the three education levels.  The figure illustrates a 
clear  education  divide:  for  all  four  age  groups  the  more  educated  have  more  liberal 
attitudes toward further immigration.  This is a fact that has been noted in many past 
studies and interpreted in many ways.  Economists have been keen to point out that the 
more highly educated people occupy more skilled positions which are less threatened by 
labour  market  competition from  unskilled  immigrants  (see  e.g.  Scheve  and  Slaughter 
2001).  According  to  the  economic  arguments  we  have  discussed  above,  this  line  of 
argument is only valid insofar are immigrants are relatively less educated than natives.  
While  this  is  true  in  some  countries,  it  is  not  in  others.    For  example,  in  the  U.K., 
Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston 2005 show that immigrants have about the same, or even 
higher, education than natives.  Moreover, education is associated with differences in a 
wide range of attitudes, including views about racial homogeneity, which may influence 
the views of better educated people about education
§§§. 
 
                                                 
§§§  See Dustmann and Preston 2004 for additional discussion and analysis. Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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The age pattern of attitudes in figure 4.5.1 is also interesting, and suggests that holding 
constant education, older people have stronger anti-immigrant views.  Given the cross 
sectional nature of the data we cannot tell whether this is a difference associated with 
aging or with differences across different birth cohorts.  It could be that individuals who 
are born, say, in the 1940s have led their whole lives with less liberal attitudes towards 
immigration than individuals born, say, in the 1980s, or it could be that they had similar 
views when at the same age and that people get less tolerant of immigration as they age.  
This  would  be  an  interesting  subject  to  study  if  future  ESS  waves  were  to  repeat 
questions on immigration. 
 
Other individual characteristics that are likely to be related to immigration attitudes are 
measures  of current  labour  market  status,  which may  predict  the  vulnerability  of the 
individual  to  labour  market  competition.  The  economic  models  we  discussed  above 
would  suggest  such  vulnerability  as  an  important  driver  for  resistance  to  further 
immigration.  Table 4.5.1 relates various measures of the individual’s employment status 
to attitude towards further immigration.  
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Table 4.5.1: Attitude to immigration and employment status 
Main activity the last 7 days  Attitude to immigration 
 






in paid work  49  51  14443 
in education  65  35  742 
Unemployed, looking for a job  44  56  1343 
Unemployed, not looking for a job  45  55  769 
Permanently sick or disabled  38  62  1169 
Retired  34  66  5179 
community or military service  45  55  98 
housework, looking after children, 
others  45  54  9608 
Other  54  46  1156 
unweighted base  15814  18693  34507 
 
The entries in the table in each row refer to the percentage of individual with respective 
characteristics that support liberal or tight immigration policies. The table demonstrates 
that those without jobs and looking for work are more resistant to immigration than those 
in paid work.  However those outside the labour force and not looking for work because 
retired, disabled or looking after children seem even more opposed. Since disabled and 
retired  people  are  more  likely  to  be  older,  while  those  who  are  unemployed  are 
disproportionately less-educated, the simple patterns in table 4.5.1 could be driven by the 
education-  and  age  effects  as  demonstrated  in  previous  figure.      A  more  complex 
multivariate analysis is required to sort out the competing explanations. 
 
Another  influence  on  attitudes  in  many  dimensions  may  be  religion.    Religious 
differences in attitudes to immigration are shown in Table 4.5.2.  Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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 Table 4.5.2: Attitudes to immigration and religion  
Religion  Attitude to immigration   
  Liberal (%)  Tight (%) 
Unweighted 
Base 
No religion  52  48  14458 
Roman Catholic  43  57  14337 
Protestant  46  54  6678 
Eastern Orthodox  15  85  2531 
Other Christian  47  53  801 
Other Religion  54  46  1055 
Unweighted base  18204  21756  39860 
 
 
 Christians of all denominations are more opposed to immigration than people of other 
religions,  or  people  who  profess  no  religion.    The  strength  of  association  between 
hostility and eastern orthodoxy stands out in the table but since this is a religion dominant 
in only one country covered by the survey (Greece) it is difficult to know whether this is 




Finally in Table 4.5.3 we compare the attitudes of those who are themselves immigrants 
with the native born as well as comparing different ethnic groups.  
Table 4.5.3: Attitudes to immigration and ethnicity and place of birth 
 
Ethnicity and birth  Attitude to immigration   
  Liberal (%)  Tight (%) 
Unweighted 
base 
Minority native  43  57  715 
Majority native  45  55  35371 
Minority immigrant  58  42  626 
Majority immigrant  53  46  2542 
Unweighted base  17908  21246  39154 
                                                 
****  Looking only within the sample of Greek respondents in the ESS, orthodox adherents in Greece are 
more hostile toward immigrants than other groups, but the size of the other group is very small, making it 
difficult to draw strong inferences. Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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 Not surprisingly, those who are themselves immigrants are more liberal than those who 
are not, though not dramatically so.  There is no evidence that native born minorities are 
more pro-immigrant that native-born members of the majority ethnic group.  
 
These tabulations suggest some systematic differences in attitudes towards immigration 
across individuals with different characteristics. A large and important role seems to be 
played by educational attainment and by age or cohort, for example. The association 
between labour market status and attitudes is contrastingly small, however.  
 
 
5.  What do we learn from opinions? 
 
What  is  most  novel  about  the  ESS  module  on  immigration  is  the  large  number  of 
questions regarding opinions on the effects of immigration.  Analysis of these questions 
has  the  potential  to  provide  a  much  clearer  picture  of  the  sources  of  differences  in 
attitudes  between  different  people.    The  questions  were  asked  at  different  levels  of 
generality.  Some questions, for example, asked fairly general questions about whether 
immigration is good or bad for the economy or the overall quality of life in the country.  
Others focused on more specific issues such as the effect of immigration on wages or 
crime rates.   Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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Figure  5.1: Attitudes to immigration and effect on the economy and quality of life 
 
 
We begin in Figure 5.1 by displaying responses to the general questions regarding the 
overall effect of immigration on the economy and the quality of life.  In each panel we 
show  the  responses  for  those  who  are  classified  as  favouring  a  more  liberal  (top)  or 
tighter (bottom) immigration policy.  The questions were answered on a 10 point scale: 
for convenience we have condensed responses to five classes
††††.  It is clear from the 
figure that those who prefer a tighter policy have more negative views about the impact 
of immigration on the economy and on the country as a whole. 
 
                                                 
†††† For each question we combine 0-2 into a category “very bad”, 2-4 into a category “bad”, 6-7 into a 
category “good” and 8-10 into a category “very good”. The central response 5, corresponding to an opinion 
that there is neither a good nor bad effect, draws a relatively large number of responses in each case and we 
centre bar graphs around this central category.   Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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Figure  5.2  presents  the  distributions  of  responses  categorised  by  education  of  the 
respondent.  There is a clear relationship between responses and education, with the more 
educated being more positive particularly about the contribution immigrants make to the 
economy, but also being more positive about the effects on the quality of life. Notice that 
educational differences in opinion are not solely concerned with economic impact.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: The effect of immigration on the economy and on the way of life, by education 
 
 
We see here that the distribution of answers to these two questions is quite similar but 
how  do  the  two  sets  of  responses  relate  to  each  other?  Table  5.1  displays  row 
probabilities where entries in row 1 give the percentage of respondents on the question 
whether  immigrants  make  the  country  a  better  place  to  live,  conditional  on  having Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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responded that immigration leads to worsening of the country’s economy.  The range of 
responses  has  been  coarsened  even  further  here  for  presentational  purposes,  with  all 
responses either  side  of  the  neutral  central  category  grouped together.    The  numbers 
suggest a strong correlation in responses, indicated by the high percentage on the main 
diagonal. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the two (raw) responses is 0.58. This 
suggests  some  commonality  in  underlying  factors  driving  both  beliefs  about  the 
economic effects, and beliefs about the overall effects on life quality.  
 
Table 5.1: Relationship between effect of immigration on the economy and on the way of life 
 
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live  Immigration good or bad 




(%)    
Neither 




Worsen   66  24  8  12515 
Neither  28  50  22  10200 
Improve  15  32  53  13608 
Unweighted base  13163  12475  10685  36323 
 
 
As  we  mentioned  above,  these  more  general  questions  are  complemented  by  a  large 
number of more specific ones.   In tables 5.2 and 5.3 we display correlation coefficients 
between some of these more specific questions, our indicator of overall sentiment toward 
further immigration (column 1) and the respondent’s view about the overall effect of 
immigration on the country’s economy (column 2).  Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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Immigration good or 





Average wages are brought 
down by immigrants  0.331  -0.337  37339 
Immigrants take jobs away or 
create new jobs   0.370  -0.530  38058 
Immigrants harm economic 
prospects of poor more than 
the rich  0.354  -0.3686  37489 
Immigrants help to fill jobs 
where there are shortages of 
workers  -0.172  0.259  38344 
Immigrants take out more than 
they put in  0.321  -0.523  37251 
All countries benefit if people 
move where skills are needed  -0.137  0.014  37870 
Total number of observations  39860  37405   
Note: Attitudes to immigration are the mean of attitudes to ethnically similar and dissimilar immigrants. 
 
 
The entries in the first column of table 5.2 show strong correlations between the opinion 
that immigration policy should be tight and the beliefs that immigrants lower wages, take 
jobs away, or are a burden to the welfare system. The correlations with the two other 
specific  questions  –  whether  immigrants  fill  vacant  jobs,  whether  immigration  yields 
benefits to all countries – are weaker but suggest that people who prefer a tight policy are 
slightly  more  likely  to  discount  the  case  that  immigrants  fill  vacancies  or  that 
immigration  helps  all  countries.    The  correlations  in  the  second  column  of  table  5.2  
closely follow those in the first column, with even stronger links between the views that 
immigrants take jobs away from other workers, or put in less than they take out, and the 
overall assessment of immigration’s effect.  In general, it seems that people who are in Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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favour  of  tighter  immigration,  or  think  that  immigration  is  on  balance  bad  for  the 
economy, have negative views on all aspects of how immigration affects the economy.  
 
Table  5.3  shows  a  similar  exercise  focusing  on  respondents’  views  about  how 
immigration affects crime, cultural life, and overall social tensions. There is a very strong 
correlation  between  responses  on  how  immigrants  affect  cultural  life  and  whether 
immigrants make the country a better place to live, suggesting that the cultural channel is 
highly salient in overall opinions about immigration.  The correlations with views about 
crime and social tension are a little smaller, but as big or bigger than the correlations with 
the economic factors presented in table 5.2. 





country better or 




Immigrants make country's 
crime problems worse or 
better 
0.327  -0.468  38438 
Country's cultural life 
undermined or enriched by 
immigrants 
0.430  -0.611  37670 
If a country wants to reduce 
tension it should stop 
immigration  
0.470  -0.446  37528 
Total number of observations  37688  37823   
Note: See note to table 5.2.  
 
 
Another set of specific questions in the ESS module refer to views about the desirability 
of social homogeneity. Table 5.4 shows the correlations of responses to these questions 
with the two overall assessment variables (our overall attitude variable, based on the view 
that immigration policy should be tight, and opinion on whether immigration makes the 
country a better place to live).  People’s overall assessment of immigration tend to be Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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relatively strongly related to their opinion on the value of homogeneity in customs and 
traditions,  somewhat  less  correlated  with  views  about  the  desirability  of  a  common 
religion, and only weakly related to views about the value of a common language and a 
single school system.  An obvious issue for further research is whether answers to these 
questions are different in countries that have a single dominant religion, language, and 
cultural  tradition,  versus  those  where  there  are  two  or  more  prominent  religions, 
languages, or cultural traditions.   
 












Better for a country if almost 
everyone shares customs and 
traditions 
0.347  -0.348  39149 
Better for a country if there is  a 
variety of different religions 
-0.263  0.290  38424 
Better for a country if almost 
everyone speak one common 
language 
0.105  -0.120  39432 
Immigrants' communities should 
be allowed separate schools 
-0.065  0.080  38562 
Total number of observations  37688  37823   
Note: See note to table 5.2. 
 
 
A  final  set  of  specific  questions  included  in  the  ESS  immigration  module  refer  to 
opinions about social contact with immigrants from the same or a different ethnic group.  
(We refer to these as measures of social distance).  Specifically, respondents were asked 
how much they would mind if their boss was an immigrant (from either the same or a 
different ethnic group) and if someone in their immediate family married an immigrant 
((from either the same or a different ethnic group).  Table 5.5 presents the correlations of Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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responses to these questions with our summary measure of attitudes toward immigration.   
The answers are about as strongly correlated with the overall attitude variable as the 
answers to the main economic questions described in table 5.2.    
 
Table 5.5: Correlation coefficients (social distance) 




Would you mind or not if your boss 
was immigrant of the same 
race/ethnic group as the majority 
0.3274  38425 
Would you mind or not if your boss 
was immigrant of different 
race/ethnic group as the majority 
0.3664  38241 
Would you mind or not if an 
immigrant of same race/ethnic 
group as majority married a close 
relative 
0.3199  38679 
Would you mind or not if an 
immigrant of different race/ethnic 
group than majority married a 
close relative 
0.3425  38440 
Total number of observations  38688   




Our interpretation of the results presented in this section is that overall attitudes toward 
immigration  incorporate  many  dimensions  of  concern  about  the  economic  and  social 
effects of immigration, and differences in underlying views about social homogeneity and 
the desirability of social contact with other people.  An important but difficult task that 
we leave for future work is to try to disentangle the various causal channels linking these 
various attitudes and values to views about immigration.   
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
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Immigration  is  a  controversial  and  increasingly  important  topic  in  the  public  policy 
debate throughout Europe.  This paper provides a brief description and analysis of a set of 
about 60 survey questions on immigration and minorities, embedded as a special module 
into the first European Social Survey.  We believe this module provides a valuable tool 
for further analysis of the role of economic interests, social and cultural concerns, and 
underlying  values  in  the  formation  of  public  attitudes  toward  immigration.  Although 
other surveys contain questions related to immigration, the ESS module is unique in the 
richness of the questions that were asked to representative samples from a large number 
of countries.  
 
Public  attitudes  towards  immigration  and  immigrant-related  issues  are  perhaps  more 
important for  shaping  migration  policies  than  factual information,  and  latent  fears  of 
immigration  are  often  exploited  in  electoral  campaigns.  A  key  question  is  how  such 
attitudes are formed.  We begin our paper with a brief theoretical discussion, pointing out 
possible reasons that may lead different people to be in favour of admitting more or fewer 
immigrants. These considerations provide some explanation for differences in attitudes 
towards different immigrant groups, as well as the differences in the views of  people 
from different socio-economic backgrounds. We then introduce the immigration module 
of the ESS. We briefly describe the development of the module, and illustrate some of the 
difficulties that arise in designing a set of questions that will be interpreted more or less 
similarly in different countries.  
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We  then  present  a  descriptive  overview  of  opinions  about  immigration  in  the  ESS 
countries.  We  analyse  responses  regarding  the  type  of  immigrants  and  their  desired 
characteristics. We illustrate the wide variation in attitudes regarding immigration policy 
across  the  24  different  countries  in  the  ESS,  and  investigate  the  correlation  between 
country-wide  attitudes  and  country-specific  characteristics,  including  income, 
unemployment, and the fraction of immigrants in the national population.  Finally, we 
analyse how responses to immigration-related questions differ according to individual 
characteristics  including  age,  education,  and  labor  force  status.  We  find  a  strong 
correlation between higher education and more favourable views toward immigration.  
We also show a tendency for older people (or those born in earlier cohorts) to be less 
favourable toward immigration. Attitudes are also related to individuals’ employment 
status, religion, and whether the individual is of immigrant or ethnic minority descent.  
 
In the final section of the paper, we use the rich detail in the ESS migration module to 
investigate  some  of  the  underlying  attitudes  and  views  that  lie  behind  an  overall 
assessment  of  immigration  policy.    Individuals  were  asked  their  views  on  whether 
immigration is beneficial for the economy, and whether immigration improves the quality 
of life in a county.  Responses to these questions are highly correlated, and also highly 
related with an individual’s stance on whether immigration should be made more liberal 
or tightened.  The strong correlation between these responses suggests that there is some 
common underlying factor structure which drives responses to both questions.  We relate 
the overall attitude questions to responses on a wide variety of specific questions about 
how  immigration  is  perceived  to  affect  the  labour  market,  cultural  life,  and  crime.  Understanding attitudes to immigration 
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Finally, we compare overall views on immigration to views on the desirability of cultural, 
ethnic,  and  religious  homogeneity,  and  on  attitudes  toward  social  interactions  with 
immigrants.   
 
We conclude that attitudes toward immigration are shaped by (and possibly shape) views 
about a variety of different channels through which immigration affects the economy, 
national  culture,  and  the social  status  of natives.    Views  toward  immigrants  are  also 
shaped by  (or  possibly  shape)  underlying  attitudes  about  social homogeneity  and  the 
desirability of social contact with other people.  In ongoing work we are attempting to 
disentangle  the  various  causal channels,  and  further  understand  the sources  of  public 
opinion on immigration.   
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